# nix-ota

Open-source OTA updates for fleets of NixOS devices. A self-hostable
control server + lightweight device agent that ship prebuilt system
closures from a binary cache to devices that don't have your flake.

Think Cachix Deploy, but you run it.

## Architecture

```
┌─────────┐  1. nix build + nix copy   ┌──────────┐
│  CI /   │ ─────────────────────────► │  Binary  │  (Attic / S3 / nix-serve / Cachix)
│ Builder │                            │   Cache  │
└────┬────┘                            └────▲─────┘
     │ 2. publish signed manifest          │
     ▼                                      │ 4. nix copy --from <cache>
┌─────────────┐  3. GET current   ┌────────┴─────┐
│  Control    │ ◄──────────────── │   Device     │
│ Server + UI │  5. POST checkin  │   Agent      │ ──► switch-to-configuration
└─────────────┘                   └──────────────┘
```

The control server **never holds the signing key**. Operators (or CI)
sign manifests with an offline ed25519 key and POST them; devices
verify against a pinned public key. A server compromise cannot push
arbitrary closures.

## Components

| Crate              | Binary             | Role                               |
|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|
| `crates/server`    | `nix-ota-server`   | REST API + SQLite + HTMX dashboard |
| `crates/agent`     | `nix-ota-agent`    | Polls, verifies, applies, rolls back|
| `crates/publisher` | `nix-ota`          | Operator/CI CLI (keygen + publish) |
| `crates/common`    | (lib)              | Manifest types + ed25519           |

## Quickstart (< 10 minutes)

> 👉 For a complete copy-pasteable setup with two real NixOS flakes
> (server host + device host), see [`examples/`](./examples/).

### 1. Generate a signing key on your workstation

```sh
nix run git+https://linus.dyrehytten.dk/max/nix-ota#nix-ota -- keygen --out ./sign.key
# prints the public key — save it, you'll bake it into every device.
```

### 2. Deploy the server

```nix
# configuration.nix
{
  imports = [ nix-ota.nixosModules.server ];
  services.nix-ota-server = {
    enable = true;
    openFirewall = true;
    publishTokenFile = "/run/secrets/nix-ota-publish-token";
  };
}
```

### 3. Install the agent on a device

```nix
{
  imports = [ nix-ota.nixosModules.agent ];
  services.nix-ota-agent = {
    enable = true;
    server         = "https://ota.example.com";
    channel        = "prod";
    deviceId       = "fridge-007";
    publicKey      = "<base64 ed25519 pubkey from step 1>";
    cacheUrl       = "https://cache.example.com";
    cachePublicKey = "cache.example.com:abc...=";
    healthCmd      = "systemctl is-system-running --wait";  # optional
  };
}
```

### 4. Publish your first update

```sh
nix build .#nixosConfigurations.fridge-007.config.system.build.toplevel
nix copy --to s3://my-cache ./result

nix run git+https://linus.dyrehytten.dk/max/nix-ota#nix-ota -- publish \
  --server https://ota.example.com \
  --token  $(cat publish-token) \
  --key    ./sign.key \
  --channel prod \
  --store-path $(readlink -f result) \
  --substituter https://cache.example.com
```

Open `https://ota.example.com/` to watch the fleet pick it up.

## How updates apply

On each poll the agent:

1. Fetches `/channels/<name>/current`.
2. Verifies the ed25519 signature against the pinned key.
3. Rejects manifests with a revision ≤ the last one applied (replay defense).
4. `nix copy --from <substituter> <storePath>` — Nix verifies cache
   signatures on every store path.
5. `nix-env -p /nix/var/nix/profiles/system --set <storePath>`
6. `<storePath>/bin/switch-to-configuration switch`
7. Runs the optional `healthCmd`. On failure: switches back to the
   previous generation and reports `rolled_back`.

## Threat model

| Threat                                  | Mitigation                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Compromised control server pushes evil  | Manifests must be signed by offline ed25519 key pinned on every device.   |
| Compromised cache serves wrong closure  | Nix verifies per-path signatures against `trusted-public-keys`.           |
| Replay of an older (vulnerable) closure | Manifest carries monotonic `revision`; agent persists & rejects rollbacks.|
| Random internet caller publishes        | `POST /channels/:name/publish` requires bearer token.                     |
| Random caller reads fleet state         | UI/API should be put behind your reverse proxy / SSO. (v1: no built-in auth on reads.) |
| Bad closure bricks device               | Health-check + magic-rollback to previous system generation.              |

**Key management:** keep `sign.key` offline (hardware token, ops laptop,
or a sealed CI secret). The server never sees it. Rotating: generate a
new key, update `publicKey` on devices in a closure published with the
old key, then start signing with the new one.

## Non-goals (v1)

- The server does no Nix evaluation or building — CI does that.
- No replacement for your binary cache — use Attic, Cachix, S3, nix-serve.
- No per-device secrets (use sops-nix / agenix inside the closure).
- No web-based config editing — config lives in your flake repo.

## Development

```sh
nix develop
cargo build --workspace
cargo test --workspace
nix flake check    # runs the full NixOS VM test
```

## License

MIT OR Apache-2.0.